Deepwater

Exploring Consciousness from the Second-Person Perspective

Christian de Quincey, Ph. D.
John F. Kennedy University

Abstract

Today, the study of consciousness within Western science and philosophy is polarized between, on the one hand, investigations of third-person, objective, correlates (e.g. neuroscience and cognitive science) and investigations of first-person, subjective, experience and phenomena (e.g. introspection and meditation), on the other. These two perspectives set the terms of debate in contemporary consciousness research: Is consciousness first-person subjective or third-person objective? How can we bridge the “explanatory gap” between objective brains and subjective minds? Although many participants in this debate recognize that a comprehensive study of consciousness must include both first-person and third-person perspectives (some still hold dogmatically to one perspective or the other), few are exploring consciousness from the second-person perspective.

Although the second-person perspective has been almost entirely overlooked in Western philosophy of mind, the notion of intersubjectivity actually has had significant proponents in other disciplines-such as linguistics, social psychology, psychotherapy, and anthropology. And, in this paper, I propose that intersubjectivity is foundational to both a philosophical understanding of, and an experiential engagement with transpersonal phenomena.

Having clarified what I mean by the key terms “consciousness,” “subjectivity,” and “intersubjectivity,” I follow with a rationale for a second-person approach to consciousness studies. I then survey significant historical precursors to the notion of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy, and go on to propose an evolutionary model of consciousness based on a distinction between intersubjective and interpersonal consciousness-a model that provides a philosophical foundation for the core insights of transpersonal psychology. I conclude by addressing some possible objections to intersubjectivity, and considering implications for a second-person methodology.

Introduction

The Vitality of Human Engagement

Being intensely engaged in relationship with another person is one of the greatest joys of being human. It is, perhaps, the most vital manifestation of consciousness. Yet it is an aspect of consciousness that, for the most part, has been overlooked in transpersonal psychology and the emerging field of consciousness studies. This approach to consciousness calls for a shift of perspective–from looking at the world as a collection of objects, or even as a collection of subjects, to a view that sees relationship as fundamental.

This perspective has not been completely ignored, however, in the Western intellectual tradition. For instance, most notably, Jewish philosopher-theologian Martin Buber (1970) recognized the importance of the “I-thou” relationship, and, two and a half thousand years ago, it was the essence of the great dialogues of Socrates at the foundation of Western philosophy.(1) Reading Plato’s dialogues, it is clear that Socrates was engaging his students in an approach similar to what I address in this paper. However, whereas Socrates was passionately on the hunt for knowledge (an epistemological quest), I’m advocating a study of intersubjective engagement as a methodology intended to elucidate the nature of consciousness itself (an ontological quest). Both quests, of course, are intimately related. The point I want to emphasize, though, is that it is precisely the degree to which Western philosophy has moved away from the Socratic dialogic influence that the second-person perspective has been sidelined–sidelined but not entirely silenced, as we will see in some detail a little later.

In this paper I argue that in addition to methodologies of first-person subjectivity (exploring consciousness from “within” through meditation and introspection), and third-person objectivity (studying external correlates of consciousness, such as brains and neurons), a holistic science of consciousness would also expand to include second-person intersubjective methodology and epistemology-to account for the inter-reflexivity of consciousness (subjectivity-reflected-in-subjectivity) in “I-thou” relationships. Whereas first-person methodologies, such as meditative practices, lead to “monologic” consciousness (Whorf, 1956), second-person methodologies, such as Bohmian dialogue, lead to “dialogic” consciousness (Bohm, 1985; 1996).

Having situated this intersubjective approach in an historical philosophical context, I will conclude with a proposal for an evolutionary model of consciousness in which intersubjectivity is primary, and suggest the direction in which a second-person methodology for exploration of consciousness might develop.

But before we look at the historical roots of dialogic philosophy, and why they failed to blossom, it will help if we are clear about the key terms: “consciousness,” “subjectivity,” and “intersubjectivity.” Having clarified how I use these terms, I will then state what I believe to be the central philosophical problem regarding these three concepts.

Clarifying Our Terms

Consciousness

Consciousness is notoriously a difficult concept to define. It is paradoxically our deepest mystery and our most intimate reality. Debates in philosophy and psychology frequently run aground in confusion because participants use the word “consciousness” with different meanings. Perhaps we should not try to define consciousness. For one thing, definitions are limiting, and for another, there is no one right way to use the term. “Consciousness” means different things to different people. And because of that, it is important to be clear on the meaning we are using. I prefer to talk about the meaning or meanings of consciousness rather than its definition.

In my experience, the most common misunderstanding arises from a basic confusion between the philosophical and psychological meanings of the term. I find it helpful, therefore, to distinguish between two basic meanings of consciousness:

Philosophical consciousness refers to a state of reality characterized by interiority, subjectivity, sentience, feeling, experience, self-agency, meaning, and purpose. Anything that has any of these has consciousness. Anything that does not would be non-conscious–blank, void, vacuous, wholly objective. This meaning refers to consciousness as context; it is about the mode of being that makes possible any and all contents and forms of consciousness. Philosophically, then, consciousness is a state or quality of being–the fact of consciousness. For example, a person (awake or asleep), a dog, or a worm exemplify consciousness in this sense; a rock, a cloud, or a computer do not. Looked at this way, it is clear that the philosophical meaning is fundamental–for without consciousness as a state of being (i.e. an ontological reality) there could be no psychological states or contents.

Psychological consciousness, on the other hand, refers to a state of consciousness (e.g. awake, dreaming, joyful, fearful, mystical), above threshold awareness. It presupposes the existence of philosophical consciousness. It is about the contents of consciousness (e.g. thoughts, beliefs, images), and about the mode of access (conscious or unconscious) to these contents. Psychological consciousness is typically contrasted with the un-conscious which is below threshold awareness (e.g., asleep, trance, coma, habit, instincts). Unconscious is not the same as non-conscious–the former still has some psychic or subjective activity present, the latter is wholly objective. For example, a person engaged in conceptual cognition is conscious in this sense; a person in a coma, or a worm, are examples of what being unconscious means.

A third meaning of consciousness refers to higher mystical or spiritual states of consciousness typified by experiences of oneness, interrelatedness, compassion, and love. However, because spiritual consciousness is a state of consciousness (albeit higher or highest), it too qualifies as a form of psychological consciousness. It is typically contrasted with “unenlightened” or “unevolved” ordinary states of consciousness.

Whenever we speak about “consciousness” it helps if we are clear about what we mean: Do we mean the state of awareness contrasted with being unconscious (psychological meaning), or do we mean the fact of awareness contrasted with the complete absence of any mental activity whatsoever (philosophical meaning)? There are many other meanings of consciousness-we will look at eight of them later when I discuss an evolutionary model of consciousness–but, I think, this distinction between psychological-content and philosophical-context is basic.(2) It will surface again when we examine the key issue of the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.